A regime change is an overthrow of a nation’s government by foreign forces. Its goal is to replace it with a friendlier one, often with the aim of spreading democracy or furthering economic interests. In fact, though, regime change policies overwhelmingly fail and produce unintended consequences. They increase the risk of civil war, increase the likelihood of human rights violations, and exacerbate international conflict. They also alienate the domestic audience of imposed leaders and push them into a wedge with their peoples. The CIA’s attempt to oust Congo-Leopoldville Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in 1960 is a classic example.
The primary argument of those who advocate regime change is that the existing government does harm to its citizens. They believe that if the people had the chance to choose their own government they would select one with their interests in mind. This is a plausible claim, and it has led to successful regime changes in some cases (the CIA’s efforts to overthrow Hussein being an example).
Yet the history of armed regime-change missions does not support this view. In fact, academic research shows that these missions seldom succeed as intended and are almost always accompanied by destabilizing effects within the targeted country.
This is because of the forces that make these missions difficult. In particular, imposing leaders must account for citizens’ payoffs and screen-ing considerations to design rewards that maximize the likelihood of their success. This imposes a degree of strategic uncertainty that creates endogenous heterogeneity in citizens’ beliefs about the regime’s vulnerability, and it limits how much rewards leaders can offer.