Escalation is a process that can take many forms and has a broad spectrum of effects. It can be a tool used to communicate stake and resolve or to demonstrate capability and can occur in any arena of conflict. For example, in the case of a war against terrorists, escalating by sending more personnel and equipment into harm’s way may be necessary to avoid a strategic defeat that could undermine deterrence. Similarly, in the case of conflict between nuclear-armed states, there is always the possibility that a misperception can lead to a perceived need to use force to protect vital national interests.
Throughout history, escalation has been neither automatic nor inevitable and it has occurred only where the belligerents felt compelled to do so by an array of interrelated factors that were shaped both by conscious decision and by instinct and emotion. These forces included the desire to win a war, the need to preserve the status quo, the need for self-preservation and the need to establish patterns of behavior. They also reflected the desire to outflank competitors, as evidenced by both the development of new capabilities and public rhetoric.
Military escalation is not a central issue in current military doctrine or planning guidance, although academic theories of escalation provide helpful frameworks for thinking about these issues. This paper seeks to reintroduce the concept of escalation as an important part of military strategy and to examine some of the barriers that make it difficult for U.S. policymakers and military leaders to consider its benefits.